The Question of Moral Relativism
Morality as a Subjective Social Construct: When "Right and Wrong" Are Whatever You Want Them To Be
In recent decades, a common criticism that has been voiced by critics of academic philosophy and various humanities disciplines is that an excess of moral relativism has entered into these academic domains. Criticisms of these kinds often originate from a variety of sources, including religious traditionalists, social conservatives, intellectuals who are self-proclaimed champions of Enlightenment rationalism, and leftists who are disdainful of postmodernism. Moral relativism is widely criticized for a variety of reasons. However, one of the most common criticisms involves the expression of the view that moral relativism provides no foundation for a shared set of social and cultural norms. This is considered to be corrosive if social cohesion and civic values on many different levels. It is suggested, for example, that moral relativism simply allows individuals to invent their own truth, and that public discourse subsequently becomes merely a matter of self-interested groups and individuals striving for power. The principal areas of concern for these critics have been either the alleged decline in the belief in the transcendent, or the alleged undermining of the values of rationality with irrationality. The question that emerges is two-pronged. First, there is the matter of whether these critics are correct in their assessment. Second, there is the question of whether there is a resolution to this dilemma.[1]
What is Moral Relativism?
Moral relativism is an approach to ethics that regards moral values as subjective in nature, and considers moral values to be something that takes place within the context of moral relativism and not moral relativism itself, which is based on culture and conventions. Throughout much of the history of Western philosophy, it was thought that there was a metaphysical dimension of moral truths that could be gained by means of discernment. Examples include the systems of ethics formulated by the great philosophers of antiquity, such as Aristotle, or the traditional Catholic view of morality as an expression of natural law. However, the advancements in human knowledge that have taken place over the past five centuries have steadily eroded the metaphysical foundations of traditional Western philosophy, including traditional ideas advanced by the Church, and influenced in part by the wider Greek and Jewish traditions concerning justice, ethics and morality. For example, developments in a range of fields of inquiry have detracted from both religious beliefs as well as idealistic philosophical systems. The result of these changes in the intellectual arena that have occurred over the course of the past centuries has been to usher in an era when moral relativism is increasingly common. [2] A key philosophical problem that present-day civilization faces is that it is known that moral metaphysics is not right on one side, but human beings are afraid to end up in moral relativism on the other hand.
One of the most important thinkers who realized the consequences of the loss of the foundations of traditional philosophical assumptions in the Western world was Friedrich Nietzsche. The German philosopher was most concerned about the “death of God” that had occurred in the modern Western world in the face of the rise of the Enlightenment. He believed this theological, philosophical, and ethical void had created a cultural crisis for Western civilization. Writing in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche believed that this crisis would continue into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and indeed, it has.
The prevalence of moral relativism has slowly emerged in the Western world in an almost clandestine manner and is most commonly represented by views such as the idea that all cultures are equal in nature, that all truth claims are worthy of equal consideration, and that individuals are capable of possessing their own “truth” claims that ostensibly have as much worth as the truth claims of others.[3] For example, according to the philosopher Douglass, Nietzsche was concerned about God's death. While Douglas does not specifically make this argument, these ideas have become increasingly common in certain academic and intellectual circles, such as those associated with radical postmodernism, even if they have not become a consensus in the present era. While views of this kind are adamantly held by many people, there certainly do not represent a consensus at this time. Yet the influence of both cultural and moral relativism continues to grow even if this growth could not yet be considered an epidemic. Increasingly, such views are also coming under criticism as well. For example, the phenomenon known as “political correctness” has often been criticized as a manifestation of both moral relativism and cultural relativism.
It could also be argued that there are different kinds of moral relativism. For example, there can be relativism in personal ethics. Someone holding this view might argue that it is perfectly fine to engage in theft, fraud, deceit, or even violent actions if one has a compelling reason for doing so or even if one simply wills to do such things from an egotistical perspective. In the political realm, it could be argued that morally questionable methods such as terrorism are legitimate if it helps a particular interest to achieve its objectives or that the suppression of human rights is acceptable if it serves the interests of the state. A moral relativist could claim that radically excluionary values such as racism or sexism are defensible if they are upheld by cultural norms or if they serve other kinds of interests or objectives. [4]
The Alleged Difficulties of Moral Relativism
Cultural relativism is based on the idea which originates from Franz Boas that the values and norms of a particular culture should be evaluated within the social framework of the culture in question itself and not on the basis of values that are external to the culture that is being examined. Moral relativism is similar to, and overlaps with cultural relativism in the sense that the morality of specific values or actions is judged and evaluated based on the standards and norms of the cultural context in which these occur. Critics of the moral relativism of this kind will argue that such a way of framing morality ultimately leads one to become an apologist for retrograde inhuman behaviors or value systems. For example, thinkers such as Sam Harris will criticize moral relativists and cultural relativists for being too hesitant to criticize religious persecution or the subordination of women in certain Islamic cultures out of fear of being overly judgmental.
Critics of moral relativism have argued that this particular way of thinking has had the effect of gradually ”creeping” into Western institutions in ways that many people do not realize. It is suggested, for example, that the foundations of traditional Western metaphysics have been undermined by scientific discovery to such a degree that the philosophical underpinnings of Western moral philosophy have essentially been eroded even if its shell remained. For example, it will be argued that even though classical Greco-Roman and Christian approaches to moral philosophy are now either implicitly or explicitly rejected by contemporary intellectuals as outdated, the core moral values that were derived from these traditions continue to dominate the society at large even if their metaphysical or theological justifications are no longer considered to be valid. As an illustration, critics of moral relativism will argue that there is no intrinsic reason why society should care about values such as democracy, equality, or human rights. Society could just as easily adopt an ethos of ”might is right” and accompanying martial values. However, it is the traditions in Western moral philosophy that gave rise to the idea of equal justice that is not considered obsolete even if their positive influences remain.
Contemporary Critics of Moral Relativism
It is important to distinguish cultural relativism from moral relativism. A range of critics in the contemporary Western world have emerged that have offered criticisms of what they regard as an excessive or alarming trend toward moral relativism. While many of these critics predictably originate from conservative or traditionalist perspectives, it is also true that there are elements among liberal and Left opinions that are also suspicious of what they regard as the inroads that proponents are making of moral relativism. For example, thinkers as diverse as Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger and the leftist intellectual Noam Chomsky have voiced criticisms of these kinds.[5] It is widely suggested that moral relativism is ultimately incompatible with the better values of modern liberal democracies, such as freedom, equality, and compassion for others. Christians have raised concerns that moral relativism will lead to a return to the values of the ancient world, where it is alleged that “might makes right” what the prevailing ethos. Some thinkers representing liberal and left opinions have argued that moral relativism is not compatible with the ideals of reason and progress that the Enlightenment generated. The difficulties that are associated with moral relativism, especially with regard to language, have been expressed by Terence McKenna in the following way:
The moral life does not consist of a wheat grass diet, affirmation, or any of that. The moral life is - unless you're at Esalen - you should clothe the naked, you should feed the hungry, comfort the afflicted, bury the dead, and there are a couple of other - obvious - things to be done. It's not about how many prostrations you do, or what lineage you've associated yourself with, or how much cholesterol is in your diet. And somehow, we have confused the ethical and moral dimension with the dimension of physical practices - probably because we have been too infected by the memes of tired Asian religions that long ago gave up moral philosophy in favor of rotational activity - because the social problems of Asia are overwhelming - that's a response to an overwhelming human tragedy - the quietude of Asian religion, I think.[6]
Clearly, McKenna is pointing to a range of trends in the contemporary Western world where traditional notions of justice and virtue that were inherited from the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian philosophical foundations of the West are being replaced by a range of other perspectives. These are perspectives that reject duty, honor, truth, or service to others as the foundations of morality. Instead, these traditional conceptions of morality are, in McKenna’s view, being replaced with an ethos of ritualistic performances and personal growth and awareness. McKenna thinks it is this replacement that is, in many ways, the same as moral relativism.
McKenna is criticizing the tendency among many contemporary Westerners to turn inward and pursue a life of self-fulfillment, even to the point of narcissism, even if such pursuits are ostensibly masked by adherence to supposedly “spiritual” values. [7] McKenna himself was an advocate of self-reflection and openness in the fight against oppressive ideologies, but he saw how Western capitalism would disturb the true value of this by promoting it as a trendy lifestyle through products. In McKana's view, this is simply food for the collective ego. In many ways, McKenna's views are similar to those of Heidegger, who expressed skepticism as to whether or not science could be considered a valid foundation for moral values. Yet such a critique of a rationalistic approach to ethics has its own problems, as evidenced by the fact that Heidegger at one point joined the German Nazi Party, which championed a philosophy that glorified the irrational.
McKenna was enthusiastic about the apparent exponential technological development in the world, and his extensive definition of technology also included psychedelic drugs. Philosophical perspectives on psychedelics were something he engaged in until his death in 2000. For McKenna, psychedelics have the potential to give people renewed insight into themselves and their circumstances by presumably moving the focus from the established and opening up to new perspectives. McKenna believes that what characterizes the psychedelic experience is that it removes boundaries in general, such as boundaries between one self and another, or between ego and what he calls “the felt presence of immediate experience”. A psychedelic bloom is for McKenna a kind of reunion with certain archaeological values that he thought ran out of a special epoch in human history where the use of psychedelic plants and fungi was central to the culture and made it possible to maintain a peaceful, gender-like society with a mutual moral code. McKenna’s view of psychedelic drugs contributes to this argument in the sense that he advances the view that psychedelic drugs can "save us" from moral relativism by bringing back a sense of the transcendent.
Sam Harris has likewise emerged as a contemporary critic of moral relativism. In particular, Harris is concerned with the impact of moral relativism on the cultural foundations of the modern Western world.[8] According to Harris, the great beauty of the modern West is the combination of material, scientific, and technological progress with political ideas that champion legal equality and the freedom of the individual. Harris considers moral relativism to be a force that ultimately undermines these values because of its radical subjectivity. For example, Harris is critical of what he regards as an excessive amount of tolerance being displayed by Westerners to cultures where the values of the Enlightenment have not been fully absorbed. For example, Harris believes that Westerners have been in many ways too tolerant of Islamic immigrant cultures, which he regards as intolerably retrograde concerning their views on women’s rights, gay rights, and the separation of church and state. Instead, criticisms of the allegedly retrograde or illiberal values of some non-Western societies are regarded as a form of chauvinism, ethnocentrism, or even racism. Harris argues that Western liberal societies should place a greater emphasis on newcomers' assimilation into Western culture rather than on multiculturalism. Harris has suggested that being overly politically correct in the name of tolerance may actually have the impact of furthering intolerance. Thinkers such as McKenna and Harris are not reactionaries who bemoan the encroachment of the values of the Enlightenment on traditional societies. Instead, they ultimately regard moral relativism as subversive to the Enlightenment project and its historical antecedents. [9]
Harris, for example, does not decry the utilization of scientific foundations as a basis for social ethics in the same way as many religious traditionalists, social conservatives, and others who decry “scientism” as a plague of modernity in regard to matters of ethics. Instead, Harris wished to anchor his view of morality in light of the principles of science. It is the argument of Harris that moral values can be derived from the application of scientific principles. For example, Harris would argue that the function of human morality is to further the betterment of human life and the quality of human societies. Harris would further argue that scientific principles provide human beings with a means of engaging in analysis and discovery. It is, therefore, possible for humans to use science to understand the world around them and to create moral values based on what furthers their own individual and collective betterment. [10] It is also true that moral relativism also states this perspective this in that what this development is for different people and cultures will vary, and that "the good life" is not the same for everyone.
Certainly, it can be argued that there is a reasonable amount of truth to this claim that human beings are capable of utilizing their senses in order to better understand the world around them. Humans are consequently able process and access information that that can be analyzed and criticized by logical means. The use of the human faculty for reason is a practice that cannot be abandoned if human progress is going to continue in a meaningful and productive way. Given the growing prominence of bioethical concerns, for example, there is no doubt that there is not a powerful relationship between religion and ethics, just as there always has been. As science continues to involve itself in matters of everyday life to an increasingly greater degree, it is likely that the question of how to apply scientific principles to moral concerns will become much more prominent. This may, in turn, mean that religion and ethical theories give different results on bioethics. Harris essentially argues that the discovery of moral truths can be made by means of science, logic, and reason in the same way that scientific principles can also help to understand phenomena in the natural world. According to this view, morality is just as beholden to science as knowledge concerning the natural world. [11] Thus, the relativism problem is allegedly solved because science and rationality will provide objective truths that cannot be changed or discussed. However, it is far from true that science is the solution to many moral problems, and certainly there have been many morally questionable or even horrific abuses of scientific values and principles in the past.
Possible Ways of Moving Forward in the Moral Debate
The perspectives that have been offered by thinkers such as McKenna and Harris are certainly helpful in many ways. It is certainly necessary that human beings have a means by which they are capable of evaluating the value of particular ideas and practices to the advancement of human life as opposed to detracting from the quality of life in human societies. McKenna and Harris would offer somewhat different solutions to this dilemma from each other. Harris regards science as the ultimate arbiter of truth. The rightfulness or wrongfulness of an idea or proposition can be defended to the degree that it can be justified through the application of the principles of science. In Harris's view, it is possible to use logic and reason, along with evidence and deliberation, for the purpose of making objective decisions concerning what advances the quality of human life and human wellbeing and what does not. McKenna, on the other hand, bemoans the erosion of certain ideas contained within the traditional Western philosophical canon. [12] These ideas are part of our problem, according to McKenna, and they help create moral relativism. The solution for McKenna is a return to the transcendent and mystical experience.
An important consideration that must be taken into account involves the ways in which there are identifiable differences between those who criticize moral relativism. As previously mentioned, there are those who believe that the alleged rise of moral relativism in the contemporary world is representative of the abandonment of older philosophical values. However, there is also disagreement concerning which sets of philosophical values should certain as a primary reference point or anchor on which moral values and moral judgments can be based. For example, religious traditionalists lament the alleged decline of the values that are derivative of the teachings of the Church. Rationalists lament the supposed decline of the values that are associated with the Enlightenment. Consequently, it is necessary that those who offer such criticisms specifically identify what they believe to be the root of the problem in terms of the intellectual decline that they believe themselves to be identifying.
For McKenna, the tendency among contemporary moral relativists to replace an ethos that is other-regarding with an ethos that is self-regarding is a dangerous fallacy. McKenna feels that such efforts erode concern for compassion, justice, and social solidarity. It would seem, however, that the ideas offered by Harris and McKenna include possibilities from a new paradigm in terms of how questions of moral philosophy and social ethics might be approached. A synthesis of Harris’ idea of science as the basis for morality based on logic, reason, and evidence and McKenna’s idea of a general emphasis on social solidarity would seem to be a powerful combination that potentially offers a way forward for humankind and a way out of the “abyss” that Nietzsche regarded as having been generated by the “death of God” and the decline of traditional values. [13]
The critics of moral relativism that regard moral relativism as having an undue or pernicious influence in contemporary philosophy and in the wider society raise certain valid arguments. In many ways, these critics echo the voice of Nietzsche, who argued in the nineteenth century that the effect of modern science and modern philosophy was that Western civilization had reached the point where it was criticizing its own foundations out of existence. Contemporary critics of moral relativism argue that Western societies continue to live in what is essentially a shell of a corpse, seeking to uphold the principles of morality and justice after having essentially killed the metaphysical and theological foundations from which they were derived. As an antidote, Terrence McKenna sought a return to the transcendent, while Sam Harris sought the development of an ethics that is rooted in rationality and science. Perhaps a necessary component of a new foundation for new ethics will be the principles of social solidarity and the recognition that all human beings share a common interest in making the world a better place. [14]
Bibliography
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Butchvarov, Panayot. Skepticism in Ethics, Indiana University Press, 1989.
Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. Los Angeles: Free Press, 2010.
Joyce, Richard. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.
McKenna, Terrence. Appreciating Information. Notes from the Psychedelic Salon, Podcast 203, Part 3, November 11, 2009. Accessed September 22, 2017 http://matrixmasters.net/salon/index.php/2009/11/11/podcast-203-appreciating-imagination-part-3/
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Smith, Douglas. Friedrich Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
[1] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 76-81.
[2] Butchvarov, Panayot. Skepticism in Ethics, Indiana University Press, 1989, pp, 121-141.
[3] Smith, Douglas. Friedrich Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 88-101.
[4] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.176-181.
[5] Audi, Robert. Moral Value and Human Diversity, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 68-77.
[6] McKenna, Terrence. Appreciating Information. Notes from the Psychedelic Salon, Podcast 203, Part 3, November 11, 2009. Accessed September 22, 2017 http://matrixmasters.net/salon/index.php/2009/11/11/podcast-203-appreciating-imagination-part-3/
[7] Joyce, Richard. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006, pp. 141-146.
[8] Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. Los Angeles: Free Press, 2010, pp. 129-139.
[9] Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. Los Angeles: Free Press, 2010, pp. 52-58.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 151-156.
[12] Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. Moral Skepticisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 181-187.
[13] Smith, Douglas. Friedrich Nietzsche. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 79-81.
[14] Harris, Sam. The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values. Los Angeles: Free Press, 2010, pp. 119-131.